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Reform of European pension systems started from a situation
in which income differentials were fairly small, partly owing
to the high coverage of the system. In Latin America,
informal working and inadequate coverage are still problems,
and income inequality is high. Even so, both regions are
moving towards individual account systems with strong links
between contributions and benefits. Latin America has
introduced compulsory financial accounts. Europe is moving
towards lifetime pay-as-you-go accounts. Some European
countries have set up notional defined contribution systems.
In Latin America, the need to provide guarantees for the
poor and the specific problem of women's poverty will be at
the forefront as long as coverage remains inadequate. Other
important issues are the minimum retirement age and the
moral hazard associated with systems that encourage or
support early retirement. Where these points and the
problems of poverty are concerned, the European experience
repays careful study.
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I
Introduction
Public pension systems in Latin America date back to
the 1930s. System design was based on what was then
the dominant model: “Europe”. In the initial stages,
systems in Latin America covered primarily employees
in the public sector and in multinational companies. In
Europe in the 1930s, with the possible exception of the
Mediterranean countries, systems tended to be more
universal although benefits were low. As in Europe,
Latin American systems expanded in the 1950s and
1960s. For the most part, however, they remained fairly
elite, reflecting the small formal-sector labour force and
high income inequality. The strong role of the State in
post-war Latin American industrialization also meant
that the covered labour force was predominantly within
the public sector. As the workforce was young and
growing, they were affordable.
This changed in the late 1970s. The oil crisis and
the ensuing inflation, the public borrowing undertaken
to keep economies afloat and then the subsequent debt
crisis of the 1980s and the ensuing decade of
stabilization and slow growth left public finances
devastated. Stabilization laid bare the sustainability
problems of the public systems, as benefit promises
could no longer be inflated away. The inequities became
clear as well. In many countries, the same contribution
record brought vastly different benefits depending on
occupation. Pension reforms were adopted to reduce
government debt and improve the equity of the system.
Latin American reforms, starting with Chile and
spreading throughout the continent, brought forth a new
model of public pension system: the defined-
contribution (DC) individual account, fully advance-
funded and privately managed (World Bank, 1994).
Latin American reforms have been influential
around the world. As European countries began to focus
on the need to reform their systems, the ideas of Latin
America were often discussed. Europe has ended up
by forging its own way in pension reform, but traces of
Latin American thinking can be found in the reforms
of 1990s. Individual accounts are now seen as key to
reform in Europe as well.
Although the Latin American model has held up
well, some problems are emerging. One of the biggest
issues is coverage (Holzmann, Packard and Cuesta,
2000). It was widely expected that this would improve
with reform, but the experience of Chile is that it has
not. As a result, Latin American systems are not
expected to prevent continued old-age poverty over the
next few decades. In the face of this growing poverty
challenge, some are looking back to Europe to see what
the Old World has done with the quintessentially New
World idea of individual accounts.
II
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development in the 1990s
Public old-age pensions were originally introduced in
Europe and elsewhere to reduce poverty in old age by
providing coverage for the entire working population
and their survivors. Although as a rule high-income
industrial countries had some form of public pension
scheme by the 1930s, the standard of living of the
elderly was still a major political concern in the
reconstruction period of the 1950s.1  A priority of many
governments was to create schemes that could benefit
persons whose human capital and savings had been
ravaged by two wars and a depression.
In a number of countries, public defined-benefit
systems with generous rules emerged in the 1950s and
1960s. Some systems combined the same benefit for
all with a benefit based on the number of covered years,
1 The Beveridge Report, published in 1942, was commissioned by
Churchill with the aim of improving the situation in the United
Kingdom after the war.
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and in some cases the number of covered years needed
for a full benefit was set much lower (e.g., 30 years)
than normal male working careers at the time, which
were 40-45 years as late as the mid-1970s (Palmer,
1999). In addition, the benefit itself may have been
based on the participant’s best x years of earnings, or
the final y years. Thus, all years did not have the same
weight. This type of benefit formula helped to bring
higher benefits to workers retiring in the 1960s and
1970s, which was the goal in many countries. In the
longer run, however, it has turned out to be a problem.
It involves an unfair redistribution from those with
longer and relatively flat earnings careers (typically
blue-collar industrial and white-collar service jobs) to
persons with shorter working careers and steep
increases in their earnings profiles (typically
professional and white-collar management careers). In
addition, these systems typically offer a full benefit at
a specific age, and sometimes also seniority rights that
allow persons with a specified number of years to retire
before this full-benefit age.
As generous rules2 matured, the workforce
participation of males declined in all the original
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries except Japan, and the
retirement age was lowered by as much as six years in
Spain and five in France, but also by four years in
Sweden, where the full-benefit age was reduced by two
years in 1976. Unisexual life expectancy from age 60
increased by around 2.5  years over the period 1975-
2000. So regardless of whether the benefit was paid to
a male worker or his surviving spouse (usually younger
by one or two years and expected to live five to six
years longer), the benefit period had increased by some
five to eight years over the 25-year period from the
mid-1970s (Palmer, 1999).
Another development in the 1960s and 1970s
would also affect Europe for a long time to come.
Bolstered by strong post-war economic growth, there
emerged an alliance of “solidarity” between unions
interested in good benefits for their members (from a
low age) and employers who were interested in setting
a contractual age limit for older workers in order to get
around last-in/first-out agreements with labour. This
alliance helped foster the idea of a life course with the
three phases of education, work and retirement that
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Full retirement
became a “life phase” specified by law and/or contract,
not infrequently with contractual benefits
supplementing statutory systems, making exit even
more attractive.
Where there is at least a theoretical choice between
work and retirement, in some countries the implicit tax
on working longer (loss of lifetime resources, after tax
benefits, from working one year longer compared to
extra earnings from continued work) can be high. The
evidence from 11 OECD countries suggests that workers
react rationally and exit the labour force at a younger
age if it is to their advantage economically (Gruber and
Wise, 1999). It is now generally recognized that the de
facto retirement age has to increase in the coming
decades and that this can only be accomplished by
changing benefit systems in the direction of actuarial
neutrality with regard to the timing of retirement and
life expectancy at retirement. This has led countries to
move in the direction of lifetime accounts, and some
(in Europe these include Italy, Latvia, Poland and
Sweden) to introduce life expectancy as an explicit
determinant of annuities.
What has happened with the goal of alleviating
poverty among the aged? As income grew rapidly,
especially during the quarter century that began with
the period of reconstruction, it was possible to transfer
increasing percentages of gross domestic product (GDP)
from workers to pensioners. Financing improved
benefits was not so difficult because people spent more
of their adult lives working, and less in retirement. As
schemes matured, the relative income status of
pensioners steadily improved.
By the mid-1990s, poverty among pensioners was
low in the OECD. Measured as 50% of median
disposable income adjusted for household size, a little
under 14% of persons aged 65 and over were in poverty
(Förster, 2000). At one extreme, represented by Canada,
the Netherlands and Sweden, the poverty rate among
persons aged 65 and over was only 3%, using the 50%
of median income measure. Interestingly, countries
achieve similar results with rather different mixes of
private and public provision (OECD, 2000).
There is variation in the poverty results within the
OECD. For example, in the United States, with its less
generous safety net, considerable immigration and
larger income distribution spread, some 20% of persons
aged 65 and over were in poverty in 1993 (Förster,
2000). However, poverty in the United States defined
as 50% of median income represents a standard of living
that is high compared to poorer countries both within
and outside the OECD. Keeping this in mind, we note
2 Systems in some countries required only 20-30 years of coverage
for a full DB benefit.
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that the poverty rate was about 20% in Turkey and 30%
in Greece.
In sum, systems in the OECD that were originally
designed to provide better benefits to persons retiring
in the initial decades after the war were affordable
up until the 1990s owing to transition rules, work
patterns and lower life expectancy. The life-course
model –with its three phases of education, work and
retirement– produced lower de facto retirement ages
which, combined with increasing longevity,
lengthened the retirement phase. As a result, pension
costs rose dramatically, with prospects of even more
significant changes to come as population ageing
continued. In conclusion, countries succeeded in
transferring growing prosperity to the elderly, but at
the same time system design and tax rules were
working in the wrong direction for financial
sustainability. By the late 1980s it was clear that
many OECD countries needed to re-engineer their
pay-as-you-go systems.
III
Latin America compared to the high-income
countries in the 1990s
In the half century after the Second World War, the high-
income OECD countries3  changed from industrial into
post-industrial economies, characterized by a high
degree of urbanization with formal market economies,
decreasing reliance on extended family structures and
increasing female labour-market participation. These
economic and cultural trends were bolstered by well-
functioning legal institutions and efficient government
administration of taxes, contributions and transfers.
There are some similarities, but also some important
differences between the high-income OECD countries
and Latin America in these respects. We consider some
of these here.
As a rule, universality is a key feature of pension
schemes in just about all the OECD, although the term
“universality” has admittedly different meanings in
different countries. Some OECD countries have special
regimes for various occupations, including the self-
employed. An example is Italy which, in addition to
special treatment of the self-employed, had pay-as-you-
go occupational schemes that ceased to be self-
supporting financially. In the 1990s, Italy moved
increasingly towards true universality, extending to the
self-employed. Others make no exceptions (e.g.,
Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and the
United States). Australia and Ireland differ in that they
have employer-based schemes. In Australia these
became mandatory in 1992, but still backed up by a
public safety net.
Compliance in high-income OECD countries has
been facilitated by the growth of large and medium-
sized business and government employers, and the
decline in self-employment. As the labour market
moves towards looser contractual arrangements, and
with a shift away from contracts occurring in the new
century, the OECD may also be facing an environment
in the future that will make evasion easier. The
legitimacy of the public pension system depends on a
public perception that people are paying their fair share.
The implication of the informal economy (non-
compliance) is that some pay, usually through their
employers, while others -in the informal economy- do
not, and that in the long run those who do pay also bear
the cost for those who do not pay. Systems that strongly
link benefits to contributions are attractive because they
underpin legitimacy for those who pay.
Pension systems in many of the countries of Latin
America are in principle universal, as in Europe and
North America, but low compliance and the informal
economy have meant that coverage is low in practice.
According to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), the average rate of informality in Latin America
is 27%, but it varies greatly between countries within a
range of 10% to 60% (IDB, 1998). Increased
formalization can both increase and decrease inequality,
depending on the point of departure. Formalization may
increase inequality up to a threshold, from which
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
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continued improvement contributes towards reducing
inequality. IDB estimates this threshold at about 25% to
30% informality. According to the IDB study, roughly
half of the Latin American countries are now close to
the point where increasing formality can be expected
to reduce inequality.4  In other words,  taxes,
contributions and transfers are either neutral or
progressive, with redistribution to the poorer rather than
the richer.
The financial account systems that became so
popular in Latin America during the 1990s, but also
the notional defined-contribution (NDC) account
schemes that entered the European scene during the
same period, redistribute the participant's individual
resources over his or her lifetime. In principle, the tax
wedge of traditional public defined-benefit (DB)
schemes has been eliminated, i.e., benefits are directly
linked to contributions. The corollary of this is that
redistribution policy is moved to the general tax-transfer
system.
The financial account schemes introduced in many
Latin American countries in the 1990s constitute a
vehicle for transferring individual resources over the
life cycle, but are also a means for developing financial
markets (Holzmann, 1997). What Latin America may
still have to learn from Europe is that pay-as-you-go
schemes can also be designed to emulate financial
account systems, when designed as NDC account
systems.
The structure of production and degree of
urbanization in Latin America is surprisingly close to
that in the high-income countries (table 1),5  but here
the resemblance ends, and where the two groups of
countries differ is mainly on points important for
pension financing. The growth of the labour force is
much higher in Latin America, and the fact that the
fertility rate is still well above two children per woman
means that Latin America will continue to generate an
expanding labour force for some time to come.
Furthermore, there is still considerable latitude for
increased female participation in the workforce. On the
other hand, as women focus more on careers and their
own earnings, the evidence from the OECD countries
shows it is likely that they will give birth to fewer
children. In sum, the demographics say that Latin
America is much better situated than the OECD for the
first quarter of the twenty-first century, but with
declining fertility even Latin America will inevitably
be faced with the situation now confronting the OECD
countries, although much later.
Another feature distinguishing Latin America from
the OECD is the relative prevalence of extended
households. In the United States, for example, only
about 15% of the population live in extended
households, whereas around 30% live in single-person
households. In Latin America the picture is very
different. From 40% (Brazil) to 55% (Argentina, Peru
and Venezuela) of the population live in extended
households, and only around 5% live in single-person
households (IDB, 1998). This suggests that transfers
within the extended family are important in Latin
America, and that they play a major role in alleviating
poverty, especially in old age. With continued economic
growth and increased formalization, the situation in
Latin America may come to resemble more closely the
present situation in the high-income countries of the
OECD, although whether people choose to live in
extended families even if they are affluent enough to
live on their own is a separate, cultural question with
considerable variance even within the OECD.
In sum, Latin America has the prerequisites for
productivity growth in the coming quarter century,
through growth of human capital. Labour-force growth
will augment this. The challenge will be to bring the
entire population into this growth process and include
them within the institutions of the formal economy
and pension systems that transfer individual resources
over the life cycle. The process of formalization
implies inclusion of most of the population in such
pension systems. In the high-income countries of the
OECD, economic growth has been a prerequisite for
successful reduction of poverty in old age, but highly
formalized labour markets with high tax compliance
and legal structures to facilitate this have also played
a major role.
4 Note that inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is typically
under 0.3 in the high-income countries, where markets are
formalized, but is typically around 0.5 or higher in Latin American
countries.
5 In this context, high-income countries are: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The data are rather old, from 1970, and it is likely that the regions
have drawn closer since then.
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IV
Storm clouds in the OECD: lessons
for Latin America
The focus of the discussion on public pension schemes
in the OECD shifted gradually from adequacy to financial
sustainability and intergenerational fairness. By 1990,
much of the OECD was discussing pension reform, with
the focus on these two issues. The discussion and the
measures taken by OECD countries may provide some
important insights for Latin America.
The logic of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems is
straightforward: increases in outlays must be
accompanied by additional financing in order to
maintain financial balance. In a stable setting with no
changes in fertility, age-specific mortality and net
immigration, the population size and composition
would remain static. If, in addition, the work patterns
and age structure of labour participation were to remain
unchanged, old-age PAYGO systems would not
encounter serious long-run financial strain. The
financial future of DB PAYGO systems in the OECD began
to be called into question because these parameters were
all changing, and projected to carry on doing so in the
direction of increasing financial strain on schemes.
Fertility has fallen well below the level needed to
TABLE 1
High-income OECD countries and Latin American and Caribbean countries:
Some data from 1970
(Percentages)
Indicator High-income countries Latin America and the Caribbean




2. Labour force 1980-1993 1993-2000 1980-1993 1993-2000
Average annual growth 0.7 0.3 2.5 2.3
3. Employment 1970 1993 1970 1993
Female share of labour force 36 38 22 27
4. Urbanization 1970 1993 1970 1993
As % of population 74 78 57 71
5. Fertility rate 1970 1993 1970 1993
2.3 1.7 5.2 3.1
Source: World Bank (1995).
reproduce the population, mortality is improving and
the labour-force participation of older workers,
especially men, has been declining.
Because of low fertility rates, labour-force growth
will turn negative within the coming decade and remain
so in most of the high-income OECD countries. In fact,
even if fertility rates were to increase to the rate of over
two children per woman needed to reproduce the
population within the next decade, this incremental
growth would not reach productive age until 2025-2035.
It is estimated that Europe may need to encourage net
immigration of around 30 million persons in the next
three decades to retain a labour force of close to its
present size. The problem will not be resolved in the
long run, however, even by a one-off increase in the
number of people of working age. As long as the overall
fertility rate remains below the level needed to
reproduce the population, permanent net immigration
will be necessary in order to maintain a labour force of
a given size.
Although real GDP grew at around 3% from 1970
until the mid-1990s (World Bank, 1995), the growth in
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the contribution base was not high enough to keep
contribution rates in PAYGO systems from creeping up
to cover cashflow deficits. By the 1990s, high and rising
contribution rates created concern not only about the
future cost of pensions and the long-term sustainability
of commitments based on current rules, but also about
the long-term effects of high contribution rates on
employment and compliance, the former due to the tax
wedge built into traditional DB systems and the latter
because individuals and employers will be more
inclined to take advantage of any opportunities to avoid
paying contributions when contribution rates are high.
The greatest pressures on OECD PAYGO old-age
pension schemes come from the trend of increasing
longevity and the tendency for older workers to leave
the labour force earlier, frequently using the public
disability system. In the OECD, people over 60 are
projected to increase from around 20% of the
population at the close of the century to 27% in 2020
and 30% in 2030 (table 2). Longevity has increased at
different rates in OECD countries, and has risen faster
for women than for men. However, men have recently
made rapid gains with major breakthroughs in
cardiovascular treatment, and these gains have yielded
quality life years.
In Germany, Sweden and the United States, for
example, the average gain in unisexual life expectancy
at age 60 has been about one year for every 10 years
that have passed since 1960. This means that life
expectancy from age 60 increased from about 17 to 21
years in Germany, from 18 to 22 years in Sweden and
from about 17.5 to 21.5 years in the United States. In
Japan the increase has been from a little over 16 to
more than 23 years! Demographers expect longevity
to continue to increase at about the same rate, although
this may be conservative, since this sort of estimate is
based largely on historical developments rather than
an assessment of the net impact of new medical
technology and changes in living habits.







If we want to maintain a target ratio between an
average benefit p and an average wage w, in order for
the contribution rate to remain constant the number of
contributors must increase at the same rate as the
number of pensioners. If longevity is going to increase
at the rate of one year for every 10 years that pass in
the future, then this is an increase of 20-25% in the
next 40 years. With a constant number of contributors
this means the contribution rate will have to increase
by the same percentage. The problem is that the growth
of the native-born labour force will be negative, and if
the trend in increasing disability take-up continues this
will become even worse. In sum, the OECD countries
cannot afford a shrinking workforce if average pensions
are to maintain their present status with respect to the
average wage, and if contribution rates are to remain
close to present levels.
There is considerable downward pressure on the age
of exit, too. In many countries, workers and employers
have taken advantage of generous seniority rules within
old-age systems and seemingly open-ended disability
systems for older workers. The result is that the average
age at which people leave the labour force has fallen in
the past three decades, as we have already noted.
Although the retirement age for a full old-age benefit in
many OECD countries is typically 65, the average age at
which people left the labour force in the mid-1990s was
as low as 56-57 for women and 59 for men.
There is considerable evidence that indicates the
trend towards earlier exit is not justifiable in the high-
income OECD countries on health grounds. As a rule,
industrial work environments have improved greatly
in the past half century and, on top of this, only around
a third of the workforce has been employed in industry.
Disability grants have increased dramatically over the
past three decades,6 while the percentage of persons
with physically demanding jobs has been relatively
constant or decreased.7
6 See, for example, Aarts, Burkhauser and de Jong (1996).
7 For example, Steuerle, Spiro and Johnson (1999) for the United
States and NSIB (2001) for Sweden.
TABLE 2
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD): Share
of the population aged over 60
(Percentages)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2050
OECD 19.9 23.1 27.0 30.7 31.2
Transition countries 17.0 18.2 21.5 22.7 26.6
Latin American countries 7.7 9.3 12.2 16.0 23.5
Asia 7.3 8.6 11.6 15.0 20.7
Middle East
and North Africa 7.3 8.1 10.0 12.4 18.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.9 9.9
Source: World Bank (1998).
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In part, the early exit of older workers is determined
by economic incentives.8  There is another force behind
the increase in disability grants to older workers when
employers need to slim down their workforces.
Especially in Europe, there seems to be a general
consensus among the social partners (management,
unions and government) that disability is a legitimate
exit path for older workers. As a result of this implicit
consensus, employers, with the support of unions, are
not especially interested in paying attention to the work
environment and on-the-job training of older workers.
This, even though on average the special requirements
of older workers are few and inexpensive to provide
(Ilmarinen, 1999). The gain to employers of laying off
older workers is a social welfare loss for the nation.
There are fewer people employed and those who have
employment have to pay higher taxes to support the
early exit of the others. The gain to employers is myopic,
too. With scarcity of labour this behaviour depletes the
supply and increases the cost of labour.
To summarize, rising longevity, declining fertility
and the current practice of pushing older workers out
of the workplace are all working in the wrong direction
for pension finances. This last tendency may undermine
the true purpose of disability, which is to provide
satisfactory income maintenance for persons with
severe illnesses and injuries. In short, adverse
demographic change and the cost-push effects of
generous systems overly utilized  were the driving
forces behind OECD reforms during the 1990s.
8 This is the subject dealt with in Gruber and Wise (1999).
V
The emergence of pay-as-you-go notional defined
contribution systems
The goal of reforms in the OECD during the 1990s was
to create more intergenerational fairness. This has been
accomplished by shifting more of the risk on to workers
while they are working by moving towards lifetime
earnings as a basis for benefit calculation. The result is
lower benefits for less work, but also usually actuarial
gains for remaining in the labour force.
A second goal was to create greater
intragenerational fairness. Schemes based on career
earnings meet this goal, too. The PAYGO NDC scheme
adopted in Italy (1995) and Sweden (1994) goes all the
way and implements a full DC career earnings model
that also accounts for changing life expectancy in the
computation of the annuity.
What is NDC PAYGO? In the NDC PAYGO system,
wage earners pay contributions based on a fixed
contribution rate and the value of these is accredited to
their notional accounts, this being the defined-
contribution feature of the system. Contributions are
paid on earnings as long as people work. The previous
year's account values are indexed annually using a
nominal per capita wage index in Sweden9  and a GDP
index in Italy. Information about changing life
expectancy and its effect on an annuity claimed at a
specific age, given an individual's account record, is
available at any time in the Swedish administrative
system. In other words, changing life expectancy is a
parameter than can be taken into account in individual
decisions about when and how to exit from the labour
force. In principle, the NDC structure makes it possible
to claim any percentage of a benefit at any time after a
legal minimum age for eligibility. People can combine
a full or partial NDC benefit with work (and continue to
contribute and acquire new rights), and then get a
recalculated benefit at some later date.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that redistribution
issues have not fallen out of the picture. All countries
have some form of guarantee and/or means-tested social
assistance to provide income support for the lifetime
poor in old age.
9 This will be supplemented, however, by a downside brake based
on the contribution wage sum, which will affect the indexation of
both notional capital and benefit payments.
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VI
Financial account systems
In the 1980s, the United Kingdom was the only OECD
country to move part of its mandatory scheme from
PAYGO to financial accounts. In 1992, Australia
mandated existing employer-based private pension
schemes, and in 1994 Sweden passed legislation
mandating a financial account system on top of its new
NDC system. The United Kingdom and Sweden kept
the PAYGO foundations in their schemes.10  Australia
kept its general revenue-financed support programme
for the elderly.11
Other countries introducing financial account
systems in the 1990s within the framework of the
mandatory public scheme have kept large PAYGO first
pillars, examples being Argentina, Hungary and Poland.
Europe has not followed Chile in eliminating the PAYGO
pillar, although both Hungary and Poland have adopted
the Chilean administrative model in financial account
system design. Sweden has not followed Chile in this
respect either, however, and countries legislating for
financial account systems more recently (e.g., Croatia
and Latvia) have tended to follow Sweden in design. In
this section we explain what lies behind the path taken
in Europe.
1. Financing the transition to financial
account systems
Why haven’t more countries followed Chile and
eliminated the PAYGO pillar altogether? There are at least
two reasons. First, Chile cut public expenditure in the
years prior to the reform, creating a surplus of 5.5% of
10 Sweden kept a large PAYGO component –with NDC PAYGO
contributions accounting for 16% of the overall contribution rate
and individual financial accounts for 2.5%– but topped up for a
large part of the workforce with newly established occupation-based
financial account systems with additional contribution rates of 2%
to 4% (e.g., 3% for blue-collar workers). Thus, for example, a young
blue-collar worker now has 65% of the total contribution rate in
individual financial accounts.
11 Since1992, employers in Australia have been required to arrange
a pension account and contribute a minimum percentage (rising
from 3% in 1992 to 9% in 2002) into it for employees. People can
supplement on a voluntary basis. About 35% of the self-employed
and 95% of full-time employees are covered. Coverage of all
employed was about 80% in 1995.
GDP which was used to cover most of the transitional
debt. Only about 1.5% of GDP per annum represented a
double burden.12  Neither Australia nor Kazakhstan had
large PAYGO commitments requiring replacement to
begin with, and thus were not confronted with the
conversion problem. In the case of Australia, the 1992
reform simply mandated employer-based schemes that
were already relatively widespread. The mandate meant
that all employers were obliged to set aside funds for
their employees and that the contribution rate for these
had to at least match the mandate.
The OECD and transition countries, and also some
Latin American countries, are demographically older
than Chile was at the time of its reform. In the OECD,
acquired rights are considerably greater. The acquired
rights that would have to be monetized with a large or
complete shift to financial account systems would be
substantial, as would be the taxes required to do this.
There is a second, more fundamental reason why
countries reforming after Chile have chosen not to
abandon their PAYGO system entirely. Both the PAYGO
and financial account systems are associated with
downside risks, and combining the two pillars in the
social security portfolio provides better security. In
Europe, Sweden and Poland13  argued along these lines.
How have countries found the means to introduce
advance-funded systems? Various mechanisms have
been employed to phase in second pillar financial
account systems. These include reducing PAYGO
commitments to pensioners, usually by changing
indexation formulas; reducing PAYGO commitments to
present workers by tightening benefit rules; taking
advantage of demographic cycles; moving other assets
into the pension system to help finance the transition;
collecting more contributions than are credited to
individual accounts, i.e., taxation; and reducing other
forms of government consumption spending (creating
a budget surplus to help finance old PAYGO
commitments) (Fox and Palmer, 2001).
Many reforms introducing financial accounts have
taken advantage of more than one of these at the same
12 Valdés-Prieto, 1997, p. 205. Note that this is 3.75% of the covered
wage bill, assuming covered wages are 40% of GDP.
13 The slogan for the Polish reform was “Security through diversity”.
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time. A typical combination consists in reducing
commitments to present workers, taking advantage of
demographics and partially financing through taxation.
The first has been accomplished by moving in the
direction of career earnings in the PAYGO benefit
formula, increasing the pension age for a minimum and/
or full benefit and, in the case of countries introducing
NDC schemes, taking life expectancy at retirement into
account in computing the lifetime benefit. Examples
are Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Sweden, but only the
last three have implemented NDC schemes. Countries
can take advantage of demographics by reforming in
good time before a large birth cohort become
pensioners. This is a typical advantage in Eastern
Europe, where the baby boom came around a decade
later than in the OECD. Lastly, some countries in Europe,
like Chile, have accepted that the introduction of a
mandatory financial account system may need to be
tax-financed, at least to some extent.
Bolivia and Poland are examples of countries that
have moved other assets into the system. In Sweden,
large PAYGO reserves will help pay for the baby-boomers
of the 1940s, thereby keeping transition costs within a
fixed contribution rate for the NDC PAYGO and funded
pillar together. The introduction of NDC reduced future
commitments in Sweden by about the amount needed
to phase in the financial account system, reducing
benefits in the PAYGO scheme for younger cohorts but
giving them a larger share in the new financial account
system.
In Chile, Australia, and Kazakhstan, financial
account systems are combined with various guarantees.
In Australia, there is a universal means- and asset-tested
income floor. Chile has a minimum pension guarantee
for covered workers plus social assistance for the poor
who are not covered. Kazakhstan also has a minimum
pension guarantee for covered workers.
Lastly, we note that there are some implicit costs
of reform that countries may have underestimated. In
countries where coverage is low, the future cost of the
guarantee could be substantial, implying an increase
in the tax rate on future workers. Even in countries
where guarantees seem affordable, costs may be
underestimated too. For example, the minimum
guarantees in Sweden and the United Kingdom are
price-indexed, but there is now pressure in the United
Kingdom to raise the floor. On the other hand, the
argument for separating out redistribution from social
insurance is that proposals to change guarantees can
be weighed against alternative uses of taxes within the
normal political process.
2. The construction of financial account systems
Chile (1981), the United Kingdom (1986), Australia
(1992) and Sweden (1995) represent four models of how
to set up financial account systems that have evolved in
the past couple of decades (table 3). Countries
introducing advance funding in the 1990s have tended
to follow one of these. There are several issues that come
up in designing financial account models. Some of these
are described and analysed in Palmer (2000).
An issue often raised is whether a social insurance
system should allow people a free choice of funds, or
restrict choice, for example to a small number of index
funds. The latter view is put forward by a number of
economists in the United States who believe that the
United States old-age social security system should be
totally or partially redesigned in the direction of advance
funding. The logic of this point of view is first that this
minimizes the risks if individuals are allowed to make
their own fund choices, while yielding a market index
return. In order to minimize administration costs, the
fund or funds managing the assets of the scheme would
be chosen through a bidding process. In one version of
this model, workers would be allowed to mix bond with
stock portfolios. In the most extreme version they would
be mandated to participate in a single portfolio, with
no opportunity for individual choice.
The argument in favour of a free choice of funds,
as in Sweden, is that the State does not need to be
paternalistic, other than to guarantee through
supervision of funds that they operate within the limits
of good practice. No fund can consistently lose money
while the majority are making positive earnings and
yet retain its participants. These will be well informed
by the mass media and will chose funds offering positive
returns. In other words, people can make informed
decisions. The bottom line is nevertheless that the
returns of neighbours can diverge, and considerably.
Those who argue for the limited or single fund model
argue that people find it difficult to accept that the
returns of separate funds can differ. What they seem to
forget, however, is that this situation must always arise
across age cohorts even if everyone is in the same fund,
simply because not everyone has the same investment
period in the unified fund (Palmer, 2001).
At the end of the investment period, individuals
would be allowed to purchase an annuity with their
accumulated pension capital. Here too a number of
alternative models arise. Annuity products could be
offered by a monopoly provider or by private companies
supplying annuity products mandated in law.
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How have models been designed?14  The first issue
is who chooses the fund manager. Should it be the
worker or the employer? In Chile, the United Kingdom
and Sweden, the choice has been given to the worker.
In Chile, each participant has one fund. In Australia,
the employer chooses the fund manager, but may opt
to contract one with several funds among which
individuals can choose. In the United Kingdom, the
fund manager that the individual contracts with may
have more than one fund to choose among. In Sweden,
TABLE 3
Mandatory financial account models at the time of reform
Who chooses Who collects Who keeps Number of funds/ Who chooses Insurance Benefit
fund manager? contributions? accounts/sends who chooses annuity provider? provider(s) forms
statements? the funds?
Chile Worker Private Private Each manager Retiree Choice of Gender-specific
1981 manager manager has one fund. leaving the annuity or
This becomes account with programmed
the worker’s the same withdrawal
fund. manager or from
purchasing an pensionable
annuity from age. A with-
an insurance drawal can be
company. exchanged for
an annuity.
Australia Employer Private Private If the manager Retiree Choice of Lum sum or
1992 manager manager chosen by the leaving the gender-specific
employer has account with annuity from
more than one the same age 55.
fund, the worker manager or Survivor
chooses the fund. purchasing benefit if the
an annuity institution
from an allows it.
insurance
company.
UK Worker Tax Private Managers Retiree Choice of Up to 25%
1986 autority manager provide more leaving the lump sum
than one fund account with and/or
choice. The the same gender-specific
worker chooses manager annuity from
the fund. or purchasing pensionable




Sweden Worker Tax authority A public Worker chooses Government State Unisexual
1995-2000 agency, which among (several monopoly/ annuity, partial
is part of the hundred) part of social or full from
social insurance registered insurance pensionable
organization, mutual funds. organization. age. Possible






14 See, for example, Palmer (2000) and Fox and Palmer (2001).
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people are presently limited to five fund choices among
several hundred registered funds.
A related issue is who chooses the annuity
provider. In Chile, Australia and the United Kingdom,
individuals themselves choose among a number of
possible providers. In Sweden, the government
provides the annuity products. The Chilean, Australian
and United Kingdom models follow more closely the
traditional insurance approach, whereas Sweden has
chosen to privatize savings during the accumulation
period, allowing people to choose just about any sort
of fund, while the annuity products are standardized
for all.
Annuity products differ also. In Chile, Australia
and the United Kingdom annuities are gender-specific,
whereas in Sweden they are based on unisexual life
expectancy. The Swedish model involves redistribution
from men to women, which is consistent with the
European court ruling on gender with regard to social
insurance benefits. All but Sweden allow lump-sum
benefits to be taken. The question is whether a lump-
sum benefit is consistent with the principle of social
security, i.e., the goal of providing income protection
throughout a pensioner's life.
Countries introducing individual financial account
systems after Chile have been aware of the high
administration costs incurred by the Chilean system and
have attempted to hold back costs with alternative forms
of administration. A first step in this direction is to
centralize the collection of contributions. This was an
obvious choice in Sweden. Contributions for social
insurance were already collected by the tax authority.
Collection of contributions creates essentially no
marginal cost.
The remaining marginal cost is that of transferring
information and money to the fund managers. Sweden
created a clearing house to direct contributions to the
participating funds and perform net transactions on behalf
of all fund participants vis-à-vis a specific fund. In all
the other three models, either individuals or their
employers, or both, deal directly with the fund managers.
Another question is who should keep the accounts
and send out statements. In Chile, Australia and the
United Kingdom the private manager does this. In the
Swedish clearing house model, a public agency (the
same agency that provides annuities) does this. The
clearing house model provides an efficient method for
executing transactions with individual fund managers,
since the agency can aggregate all sales and purchases
in a transaction day into one single transaction.
In sum, the OECD countries have not followed Chile
in attempting to rid themselves of PAYGO schemes and
introduce financial account schemes. The one
exception, Australia, did not have a PAYGO system to
begin with, but had an extensive general revenue-
financed safety net that should be expected to become
smaller as the newly mandated employer-based
financial account schemes mature. The traditional OECD
countries have large acquired PAYGO rights, compared
with Chile at the time of its reform. To date, this has
cooled any interest in mandating financial account
systems. Where financial account systems have been
introduced, younger generations have traded rights in
the PAYGO scheme for rights in the financial account
scheme. What European countries that have introduced
financial account schemes have done is to mix these
with PAYGO, diversifying participant risk between
economic and financial rates of return.
VII
Poverty and women
One of the strengths of post-war OECD systems has been
their poverty reduction impact. Most of this can be
attributed to the high coverage level. Two other factors
are also important: i) special provision for women and
ii) added safety-net factors. The expansion of coverage
in OECD systems took as its starting point the need to
provide income security for families, especially
widows. System designs usually included the following
additional benefits, which almost exclusively helped
women:
• survivors' benefits for a spouse with no pension or
a lower pension and for minor children until they
reached maturity or left school (to replace the loss
of the main breadwinner's income or pension);
• pension credit for time out of the labour force having
children (to boost the pensions of women who are
in the workforce except when raising children); and
• for funded systems, unisex annuities in a DB or DC
scheme (compensating women for a longer life
expectancy than men).
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These factors have been important in reducing the
poverty rate among the ageing population. Many
systems originally included a lower retirement age for
women as well. These were put in place because women
tended to be younger than their husbands, and it was
considered desirable to have both partners retiring at
the same time. For women, this provision was a mixed
blessing. In DB systems with low eligibility thresholds,
it meant redistribution to women. In systems where
benefits are tied tightly to contributions, this provision
can result in lower pensions for women owing to a
shorter contribution time.
Poverty reduction is also achieved through targeted
redistribution in old-age systems. All OECD systems
include some type of minimum pension. In some cases,
this is a demogrant, providing a minimum income floor
for all those above retirement age, regardless of
contributions (Sweden before system reform, Denmark,
Australia, New Zealand, United States). In other cases,
it is a minimum pension with a years-of-contribution
eligibility requirement. The purpose of minimums with
an eligibility requirement was twofold: they increased
incentives to participate for lower-income workers,
increasing coverage and thus public support for the
system, and they reduced poverty.
The European reform trend towards a stronger link
between contributions and benefits has changed, but
not eroded, many of these benefits. Most systems have
retained a minimum benefit. For women, non-
discrimination statutes are causing most countries to
equalize retirement ages. However, the same statutes
are requiring unisex annuities, entailing a transfer
especially to single women (for married couples, it is
effectively an intra-household transfer if survivor
benefits are in place). Many countries are keeping the
childcare pension credit in public systems (although
not in occupational systems). In Sweden, the childcare
credit is paid for by a transfer from the general budget
to the social insurance budget so that the funds are even
available for investment into the mandatory funded DC
system. In that country, the high labour-force
participation of women, the relative equality of men's
and women's wages and the childcare credit that
compensates women for time out of the labour force
are expected to lead to a fairly equal distribution of
pensions and adequate protection for women. As a
result, Sweden is gradually eliminating the survivor
benefit for spouses in the PAYGO system, but has given
participants in the financial account system a choice of
a joint annuity.
Lastly, most OECD countries have social assistance
systems providing benefits in cash and in kind, which
offer the ultimate social safety net. These are being
eliminated; yet the move towards contribution-related
pensions is expected to make these systems more
important, not less important, over time.
VIII
Lessons for Latin America
For reasons quite similar to those seen in Europe, Latin
American countries have been moving away from
redistributive DB systems towards contribution-related
systems. The goals have often been the same:
• reducing future expenditures by raising the
retirement age;
• reducing moral hazard;
• increasing public savings.
A number of important differences have emerged,
however, between Latin America and European
reforms. European countries: i) have retained a stronger
PAYGO component than, for example, Chile and those
countries in Latin America which followed the Chilean
model; ii) have maintained the anti-poverty component,
but redistribution is more targeted, and is low-cost
owing to the high overall coverage rate; iii) have
maintained or encouraged supplementary occupational
systems; iv) have continued to include special
protections for women, and v) have been looking for a
way to wholesale fund management and thus realize
economies of scale in this key area.
José Piñera’s dream of closing down the public
PAYGO system is not one shared by the majority of voters
in Europe today. European voters continue to value the
public pension system for several reasons. By contrast
with the situation in Latin America, it has provided
adequate pensions for most households, thus preventing
deprivation among older households. Younger as well
as older voters value this. The movement to individual
accounts is a politically acceptable reform of PAYGO
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 9  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 3140
PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE IN  THE 1990s: LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA  •  LOUISE FOX AND EDWARD PALMER
because in Europe, with near-universal coverage and
more equal lifetime wage distributions, an individual
account system will still provide adequate old-age
security. Maintaining partial PAYGO allows European
systems some flexibility in the event of further shocks,
and allows some redistribution (towards women and
the lifetime poor) to continue at a fairly low cost. A
system which mimics the distribution of wage and
salary income in the distribution of pensions is broadly
acceptable because the underlying income distributions
are more equal.
In most Latin American countries, the distribution
of income is much more unequal. Macroeconomic
shocks are greater and spells of unemployment tend to
be more frequent. As a result, pensions based on
contributions alone may not be adequate for old-age
security. The contribution-based pension model, with
a retirement-age life expectancy of about 12 to 15 years,
is affordable on a fully or partially advance-funded basis
for most countries. It should provide adequate
protection against poverty for those who contribute for
about 40 years. The problem is the uncovered
population, or the partially covered population: those
with long spells out of coverage due to time out of the
labour force to raise children, unemployment or time
in the informal sector between formal-sector jobs. The
main issue is how to increase coverage and thus old-
age security for the rest of the current workforce. This
most likely requires some redistribution, which a pure
individual accounts system cannot provide.
European systems expanded coverage at a time of
low public debt, low wage and income inequality and
rapid wage and labour-market growth. They did this
with low eligibility requirements and minimum
pensions. These policies were redistributive within and
between generations, the latter because of PAYGO
financing. As coverage expanded and the population
matured, these policies became too expensive. As we
have seen above, the story of the 1990s was the scaling
back of this redistribution (now that coverage was near-
universal). Minimum pension policies now tend to be
more targeted on the lifetime poor.
Latin American economies do not currently have
this fortuitous configuration. Although the labour force
is growing rapidly, real wages have not been rising
rapidly in most countries except Chile, and income
inequality is high. Public debt is also high, in part
because of the need to pay down generous pensions
granted under the old system. As a result, significant
redistribution would be quite expensive if adopted now
with PAYGO financing (as some countries have already
experienced).
There may, however, be some scope for increasing
coverage and poverty alleviation through limited
redistribution. Chile, for example, provides a
guaranteed minimum pension given x years of
coverage. Bolivia provides the Bonosol, a demogrant
given at age 65. Other countries could consider using
privatization revenues to provide a guaranteed
minimum, perhaps requiring only 10 years of
contributions but a high retirement age. The key in
enacting such a policy is i) to keep the guarantee low
and ii) to keep the retirement age high. If not, the
incentive to contribute is eroded and the cost becomes
unaffordable.
Another way to keep the public system affordable
is to develop a complementary occupational pension
system, outside the public system. Schemes inside the
public system are a bad idea, as they generally transfer
tax revenues from poorer households to richer ones.
However, privately organized schemes (including those
organized by unions) can release pressure from public
schemes. They can be both a bridge to the public scheme
in the case of early retirement and a solution to the
problem of special groups such as teachers or civil
servants. Two lessons from Europe emerge, however.
First, careful regulation is required irrespective of
whether schemes are DB or DC. Second, DC pensions
are more affordable and easier to regulate, and facilitate
labour mobility and economic restructuring.
Pensions have been an important factor in
keeping many widows and single elderly women
out of poverty. Individual account systems, which
provide less redistr ibution,  may reverse this.
Adopting the European approach to gender issues
in pensions would help Latin American systems
reduce poverty. Most countries which now have
individual account systems also stipulate a lower
retirement age for women. In a contribution-based
system, as noted above, this will lead to lower
pensions for women, especially when combined
with gender-specific annuities. As a result, many
women will find themselves collecting the minimum
pension if they collect any pension at all. Survivors'
pensions and joint  annuit ies  would help to
counteract this trend.
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IX
Summary and conclusions
There are important differences in the economic
histories of the Latin American and European countries,
and these have shaped pension systems and reform
options as we move into the first half of the twenty-
first century. In Europe, expansion of systems was
closely tied to expansion of formal labour-market
participation. Universality of pension systems
developed simultaneously with other labour market
institutions, and inequality decreased as a result. In
Latin America, this did not occur. As a result, attempts
to provide universal coverage through contributory
systems did not work. Expansion required large and
unsustainable public transfers. In addition, Latin
American systems developed some of the same early
exit problems as European ones, but were financed from
a much narrower contribution base. Financial problems
occurred much earlier, and were far more serious.
Latin America has learned that public pension
system objectives and means need to be consistent with
economic fundamentals in order to be sustainable. Latin
American reforms have shown European countries new
ways of reconciling pension systems to these
fundamentals: financial DC individual account schemes.
This approach has brought financial stability to Latin
American pension systems. However, these systems
effectively replicate the inequality of labour income in
retirement income, and reflect the degree of formality
of the economy. Increased poverty reduction may
require increased attention to the causes of old-age
poverty (low lifetime income, especially among
women) and structured, low-cost approaches to
managing this risk, financed on a PAYGO basis. These
may include:
• increased transfers to formal-sector women from
men during the working years, so that retirement
income will be adequate. This might include
childcare pension credits or unisex annuities;
• affordable minimum pensions (many Latin
American systems now include these);
• affordable means-tested transfers to ageing
households.
However, all these mechanisms need to be
developed slowly and expanded gradually to avoid the
unsustainability problems of previous attempts.
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